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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
RONALD EDWIN GALLATLY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 
11337 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Appeal from a jury verdict of guilty to the crime of 
grand larcency and a denial of a motion for a new trial in 
the Second Judicial District, County of Morgan, Stat.e of 
Utah, the Honorable John F. Wahlquist presiding. 
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PHIL L HANSEN 
Attorney General 
GERALD G. GUNDRY 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
236 Stat.e Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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RONALD E. GALLATLY 
Appellant Pro Se 
Post Office Box 250 
Draper, Utah 
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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
RONALD EDWIN GALLATLY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 
11337 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, Ronald Edwin Gallatly, appeals 
from a jury verdict of guilty to the crime of grand 
larcency, a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-38-4 
(1953). He further appeals the denial of his motion 
for a new trial based on grounds of newly discov-
ered evidence. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On November 3, 1967, the appellant by jury 
verdict was found guilty of the crime of grand 
larceny and was sentenced, February 6, 1968, to the 
Utah State Prison for a term of not less than one 
year and not more than ten years as provided by 
law by the Honorable John F. Wahlquist. On Jan-
2 
uary 22, 1968, the appellant moved the trial court 
for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. 
A hearing was held the same day and the motion 
was denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent requests that the conviction of the 
appellant for the crime of grand larceny be affirmed 
and that the judgment of the trial court denying the 
appellant's motion for a new trial be sustained. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about June 8, 1967, a saddle, a bridle, a 
rope and a martingale were stolen from Amos 
Bingham at Milton, Morgan County, Utah. (R. 63) 
Mrs. LeAnn Hill, formerly Miss LeAnn Clark, 
testified that on or about the night of June 8, 1967, 
she had planned to go on a drinking party with the 
appellant, but that she and the appellant decided 
to go to the appellant's brother's house at Syracuse, 
Utah, to get some rabbits to sell to her uncle. (R. 16, 
31) Mrs. Hill testified that she consumed half a fifth 
of whiskey while at the house of the appellant's 
brother and passed out recalling only that she had 
demanded that the appellant take her with him 
when he took her car. (R. 17, 34-38) After leaving 
Syracuse she had been awakened by the appel-
lant hitting or shoving her and telling her to be 
quiet. (R. 18) She awoke the next morning to find a 
saddle lying on her bedroom floor (R. 17) and the 
appellant sleeping nearby on a sheepskin ruq. (R. 17) 
The saddle had the name "Pete" written across its 
back. (R. 18) Mrs. Hill testified that the appellant had 
referred to the saddle as his saddle (R. 40) and that 
he had asked her to keep it for him. (R. 19) The wit-
ness stated that she kept the saddle for the appel-
lant, that he subsequently took it to his house for 
several days, and that he returned it to her house 
thereafter. (R. 19) 
Mrs. Hill further testified that the appellant told 
her he needed money and directed her to sell the 
saddle, (R. 44) stating that if the buyer wanted to 
know where the saddle came from, she was to say 
she "got it at an auction." (R. 20) The saddle was 
sold to Pete Miller for $65.00. (R. 20, 45) Mr. Miller 
later called Miss Clark telling her that the saddle 
was stolen and that he wanted his money back. 
(R. 20, 73, 77) Miss Clark returned the money to Mr. 
Miller who had informed the county sheriff about 
the stolen saddle. The sheriff took possession of the 
saddle. (R. 21) 
Testimony of Mrs. Hill showed that she ob-
tained possession of a bridle strap marked as State's 
exhibit B from the appellant (R. 22) which was identi-
fied by Amos Bingham as one taken from his barn 
at about the same time the saddle and the other 
items were stolen. (R. 62-63) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY PERMITTED THE 
CASE TO GO TO THE JURY SINCE THE EVIDENCE 
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PRESENTED BY THE STATE WAS SUCH THAT 
REASONABLE PERSONS COULD FIND THAT THE 
APPELLANT TOOK THE SADDLE WITH FELONIOUS 
INTENT. 
Larceny is the felonious stealing, taking, carry-
ing, leading or driving away the personal property 
of another. Utah Code Ann. § 76-38-1 ( 1953). 
The state concedes and this court has held that 
there must be an intent to steal at the time of the 
aking and that intent is a necessary element of the 
crime of larcency. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-120 (1953). 
People v. Miller. 4 Utah 410, 11 Pac. 514 (1886); State 
v. Allen. 56 Utah 37, 189 Pac. 84 (1920). However: 
... intent is not always disclosed by what one says, 
but also by what one does, or fails to say or do in 
(a) given situation, together with other facts and 
circumstances surrounding (the) transaction. Loper 
v. United States, 160 F.2d 293 at 294 (9th Cir. 
1947). See State v. Shonka, 3 Utah 2d 124, 279 
P.2d 711 (1955). 
The elements of the crime of grand larceny were 
outlined in State v. Peterson, 110 Utah 413, 174 P.2d 
843 (1946) and restated in State v. Shonka. 2 Utah 2d 
124 at 126, 276 P.2d 711 at 713 (1955) where the court 
held: 
"If the evidence favorable to the state, with all 
reasonable inferences and intendments that can be 
drawn therefrom, could sustain a verdict of guilty 
the cause should be submitted to the jury." That 
is, the evidence must be such that reasonable minds 
could believe beyond a reasonable doubt that each 
of the following elements of larceny existed: (1) tak-
ing and (2) carrying away of the (3) personal 
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property (valued over $50.00) (4) of another (5) by 
trespass without the owner's consent (6) with the 
intent to steal. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-38-1 (1953) provides: 
Possession of property recently stolen, when the 
person in possession fails to make a satisfactory 
explanation, shall be deemed prima facie evidence 
of guilt. 
In State v. Richards. 3 Utah 2d 368 at 370, 284 
P.2d 691at692 (19.55) the court said: 
This court has stated many times the rule to be 
regarded by the court as to the evidence necessary 
to prove intent in a larceny case. If the evidence is 
such that all reasonable minds should arrive at the 
conclusions that the taking was without felonious 
intent, then the question becomes one of law, and 
the verdict of guilty should be set aside. But if, aft.er 
a consideration of all the evidence, reasonable minds 
may differ and arrive at opposite conclusions the 
findings of the jury must control. (Citing cases.) 
In affirming the conviction in Richards, supra. 
the court held that considering the defendant's pos-
session of the sheep, his dominion over it, his lack 
of other explanation, and his stealth in the appropri-
ation of the animal, the jury might well conclude 
that the defendant's intent was to deprive the own-
er of his property. 
In State v. Peppacostas. 17 Utah 2d 197, 407 P.2d 
576 (1965) this Court held that the possession and 
claimed ownership of a stolen 357 Magnum pistol 
by the defendant was sufficient evidence to support 
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a conviction for grand larceny. See also State v. 
Martinez, ________ Utah 2d, ________ , ________ P.2d ________ (1968). 
The evidence presented in the instant case 
shows that the appellant was found asleep in the 
home of LeAnn Clark with a saddle he claimed to 
be his and which he moved to his own house and 
back to Miss Clark's He asked LeAnn Clark to sell 
the saddle for him. The evidence also shows that 
he had had possession of a bridle strap which was 
one of the other items stolen along with the saddle. 
Under the facts of this case the appellant's pos-
session of the saddle by itself was sufficient to estab-
lish prima fade evidence against him. All of the facts 
taken together were s11fficient to permit the jury to 
determine that the appellant took the saddle with 
felonious intent at the time of the taking. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED AP-
PELLANT'S MOTION FOR A CHANGE OF VENUE. 
The appellant apparently contends that the trial 
court erred in not granting his motion for a change 
of venue since several members of the jury had 
heard rumors about the case. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-30-21 (1953) provides: 
. . . no person shall be disqualified as a juror by 
reason of having formed or expressed an opinion 
upon the matter of cause submitted to such jury 
founded upon public rumor ... , provided it appears 
to the court, upon his declaration under oath or 
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otherwise, that he can and will, notwithstanding 
such opinion, act impartially and fairly upon the 
matters submitted to him. The challenge may be 
oral, but must be entered in the minutes of the 
court or noted by the reporter. 
In the instant case there is no evidence show-
ing that any juror had formed or expressed an 
opinion as to the appellant's guilt or innocence 
prior to trial. The members of the jury were sworn to 
act impartially and fairly on the matters submitted 
to them. 
The court granted the appellant's challenges to 
prospective jurors where it was shown that a juror 
was a first cousin to the sheriff (R. 6) or a friend of 
Amos Bingham, the ovvner of the stolen property 
(R. 4) or had personal knowledge of the case (R. 4, 
6, 7) or was a part-time sheriff. (R. 6) 
In the abseEce of showing prejudice it is pre-
sumed that the appellant received a fair trial and the 
burden is on the appellant to establish his right to 
a change of venue. State v. Hunt. 2 Ariz. App. 6, 406 
P.2d 208 (1965); Leah v. State. Okla. Cr. 398 P.2d 857 
(1965). See McGuffey v. Turner. 18 Utah 2d 354, 423 
P.2d 166 (1967). 
The denial of the appellant's motion for a 
change of venue is not error where there is no evi-
dence adduced to esta_blish prejudice against the 
appellant. State v. Eldridge, 197 Kan. 694, 421 P.2d 
170 (1966); State v. Bareck, 143 Mont. 273, 389 P.2d 
170 (1964). 
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This court held that it is within the sound discre-
tion of the trial court to grant or deny a motion for 
a change of venue under Utah Code Ann. § 77-26-1 
(1953), and that in the absence of showing abuse the 
trial courts judgment should be affirmed. State v. 
Smith, 11 Utah 2d 287, 358 P.?.d 342 (1961); State v. 
Green. 86 Utah 192, 40 P.2d 961 (1935); State v. Kazda, 
15 Utah 2d 313, 392 P.2d 486 (1964). 
In State v. Green, supra, the examination of the 
jurors in a homocide prosecution showed that many 
of them had read or heard something about the 
case, but it did not appear that there was any serious 
difficulty in securing a iury. The court held that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denyinq 
the defendant's motion for a chanqe in venue. 
Respondent submits that there is no evidence 
showing that there was any difficulty in securing a 
jury or that the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying the appellant's motion for a change of 
venue. 
Appellant contends that it was error for the 
court to permit relatives of Amos Bingham to sit as 
jurors. However, the record is devoid of any evi-
dence showing that any relative of Mr. Bingham was 
a member of the jury. At most the record shows that 
the peremptory chaJlenge to second cousin of the 
sheriff was denied. (R. 6) Since the sheriff was not 
the person injured and it does not appear that the 
sheriff signed the complaint instituting the prosecu-
tion against the appellant, it cannot be claimed this 
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was error under provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 
77-30-19(1) (1953). 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED AP-
PELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
In his supplemental brief the appellant con-
tends that the trial court erred in not granting his 
motion for a new trial based on evidence discovered 
subsequent to the appellant's conviction of grand 
larceny. 
The newly discovered evidence consisted of a 
statement by the appellant that he did not testify at 
his trial on the advise of his attorney (Supp. Tr. 12); 
that he had tried to protect LeAnn Clark (Hill) (Supp. 
Tr. 7); that he did not take the saddle (Supp. Tr. 7); 
that before his trial he knew that Dick Crane was 
involved in the theft (Supp. Tr. 8, 14); that he did not 
tell his attorney about "these things" until after his 
trial and conviction (Supp. Tr. 8); and that he knew 
before the trial about the testimony that would be 
introduced against him by LeAnn Clark (Supp. Tr. 
13). 
The appellant called Fred Batchelor, an inmate 
at the Weber County Jail, who testified that Dick 
Crane had told him that Ronald Gallatly was in jail 
for a crime that Crane had committed. (Supp. Tr. 22, 
24) 
Another inmate, Guy Gaily, testified that he had 
discussed with LeAnn Clark (Hill) during the period 
of investigation of the theft, several explanations 
which she could give to the police as to how she 
had come into possession of the saddle. (Supp. Tr. 
28) 
Kenneth Gallatly, brother of the appellant, testi-
fied that a saddle with the word "Pete" had been in 
his barn before the episode about the rabbits (Supp. 
Tr. 37) and that the appellant was with him at his 
house on the night he was supposed to have been 
at Miss Clark's house. (Supp. Tr. 41) 
In his brief the appellant asserts that the prose-
cution admitted that the evidence supported a con-
viction only for receiving stolen property. The rec-
ord shows that the prosecution talked with the 
appellant about pleading guilty to receiving stolen 
property stating that "this was the least you were 
guilty of in view of the evidence .... " (Supp. Tr. 13) 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-3(7) (1953) provides: 
When a verdict or decision has been rendered 
against the defendant the court may, upon his appli-
cation, grant a new trial ... 
When new evidence has h e e n discovered, 
material to the defendant and which he could not 
with reasonable diligence have discovered and pro-
duced at the trial. 
"Newly discovered evidence" must be evi-
dence which was not discoverable with reasonable 
diligence, State v. Hawkins, 81 Utah 16, 16 P.2d 713 
( 1932) and the burden of proving diligence is on the 
defendant. United States v. Fassoulis, 203 F. Supp. 
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114 (D.C.N.Y. 1962); United States v. Edwards, 366 
F.2d 853, (2d Cir. 1966), cert. den. 386 U.S. 908. Fur-
thermore, application for a new trial based on newly 
discovered evidence should be considered with 
caution. Long v. United States. 139 F.2d 652 (C.C.A. 
Okl. 1944). 
In United States v. Smith, 179 F.Supp. 684 
(D.C.D.C. 1959), aff'd 283 F.2d 607, 109 U.S. App. D.C. 
28 (1960), cert. den. 364 U.S. 938 (1961), in consider-
ing a motion for a new trial based on newly discov-
ered evidence, the court held that the rule has al-
ways been that newly discovered evidence must 
be evidence which could not have been discovered 
by the exercise of due diligence for use at the trial. 
Facts within the knowledge of the accused at 
the time of trial are not newly discovered and will 
not authorize a new trial even though he did not 
make these facts known to his counsel until after 
trial. People v. English, 68 C.A.2d 670, 157 P.2d 429 
(1945). The reason for this rule is to prevent the de-
fendant from withholding evidence and speculating 
on the outcome, and, if it turns out adversly to him, 
later seek to employ the evidence he withheld as 
grounds for a new trial State v. Payne, 195 Ore. 624, 
244 P.2d 1025 (1952). 
In the instant case the appellant admitted that 
he had knowledge before his trial of the evidence 
he introduced as "newly discovered evidence." In 
this case there is no sound reason why the evidence 
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presented by the appellant should be considered as 
"newly discovered evidence" entitling the appel-
lant to a new trial. 
It is well established that the trial court has 
broad discretion in determining whether or not to 
grant a new trial based on insufficient evidence or 
on newly discovered evidence. State v. Cooper. 114 
Utah S31, 201 P.2d 764 (1949); State v. Duncan. 102 
Utah 449, 132 P.2d 121 (1942). The evidence present-
ed by the appellant was insufficient to have war-
ranted the trial court granting a new trial based on 
newly discovered evidence. There is no showing 
that the trial court abused its discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
1. There was sufficient evidence from which the 
jury could reasonably find that the appellant took 
the saddle with felonious intent at the time of the 
taking. 
2. The evidence does not support appellant's con-
tention that the trial court abused its discretion 
in denying appellant's motion for a change of 
venue. 
3. The appellant failed to prove that his alleged 
"newly discovered evidence" was in fact newly 
discovered evidence within the meaning of Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-38-3(7) ( 1953). 
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For the reasons states the respondent requests 
that the judgment of the trial court be affirmea. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
GERALD G. GUNDRY 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
